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Conjectural Variations and Evolutionary
Stability: A Rationale for Consistency
by
WIELAND MÜLLER AND HANS-THEO NORMANN∗
Adopting an evolutionary approach, we explain the conjectural variations ﬁrms
may hold in duopoly. Given conjectures, ﬁrms play the market game rationally.
Success in the market game determines ﬁtness in the evolutionary game. Based
on linear heterogeneous Cournot and Bertrand competitionmodels, we show that
the unique conjectures that are evolutionarily stable are consistent in that they
anticipate the rival’s behavior correctly. (JEL: D 43)
1 Introduction
The predictions of oligopoly theory depend crucially on behavioral assumptions
on how a ﬁrm conjectures other ﬁrms will react to its own actions. Cournot made
the assumption that ﬁrms maximize their proﬁts taking as given the quantity of
the rival ﬁrms, that is, rivals do not react at all to changes of a ﬁrm’s own ac-
tion. Later contributions by BOWLEY [1924], STACKELBERG[1934], HICKS [1935],
and LEONTIEFF [1936] varied this assumption and proposed alternative solutions,
initiating the conjectural-variations literature.
Interestinconjecturalvariationsgrewwiththeanalysisoftheconsistencycriteria.
In addition to the individual rationality assumption underlying the notion of Nash
equilibrium, consistency requires that conjectures about rivals’ behavior be correct.
InBRESNAHAN[1981],theconsistencyofconjecturesoccurswhenevertheslopesof
ﬁrms’ reaction functions are (locally) equal to the conjectural variations.1 Applying
this deﬁnition, BRESNAHAN [1981] shows that a unique solution exists for duopoly
with linear–quadratic costs.
The literature following BRESNAHAN [1981] pointed out two fundamental prob-
lemswiththeconjectural-variations approachandtheconsistency criteriainparticu-
lar: “The heart of the problem is the notion of a conjectural variation. This notion is
∗ We thank Jörg Oechssler, Yossi Spiegel, and two anonymous referees for helpful
comments. The ﬁrst author acknowledges ﬁnancial support from the German Science
Foundation, DFG. Furthermore he thanks the Center for Experimental Social Science
(CESS) at New York University for its hospitality.
1 This deﬁnition can actually be traced back to LEONTIEFF [1936]. See also MAR-
TIN [2002].
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ad hoc inasmuch as none of the models using a conjectural variation explains how it
is formed or whence it came” (DAUGHETY [1985, p. 369]). The second problem is
closely related to the ﬁrst. Conjectures have been found very difﬁcult to rationalize
(MAKOWSKI[1987]). Theorists may ﬁnd consistent conjectures appealing because
of the parallel to rational-expectations theory. However, attempts to derive conjec-
turesmerelyfrom rationality assumptions have not been successful. Conjecturesare
essentially “a-rational” (MAKOWSKI[1987]).
Recently,someauthorsaddressedtheseproblemsbyproposingexplicitlydynamic
models, usually repeated Cournot settings (DOCKNER [1992], SABOURIAN [1992],
CABRAL [1995]). These authors examine conditions under which the outcome of
the repeated game equals the outcome of the static conjectural-variations model.
For example, CABRAL [1995] proposes an inﬁnitely repeated game with minimax
punishments. He shows that, for each discount factor and for any linear oligopoly
structure, there is a conjectural variation such that a ﬁrm’s output in the optimal
equilibrium is equal to the quantity of the conjectural-variations solution. In this
way, the conjectural-variations models are justiﬁed as a “short cut” (SABOURIAN
[1992,p.236]),mimickingtheoutcomeofmorecomplexdynamicgames.However,
note that only the conjectural-variations outcome is justiﬁed; nothing is said about
the origin and nature of the conjectures themselves.
In this paper, we propose an evolutionary approach to explain conjectures.
We do not impose any rationality or consistency criterion on the conjectures
ﬁrms may hold. However, given the conjectures, ﬁrms play the market game
rationally. The link between market performance and conjectures is that proﬁts
in the duopoly game determine the success in an evolutionary game. So, what
our model does is to impose evolutionary selection of conjectures and rational
choice of actions in the basic market game. As a result, we show that the con-
jectures surviving the evolutionary process are the consistent conjectures pro-
posed by BRESNAHAN [1981]. That is, we do not only justify the market out-
come implied by consistent conjectures; we also justify the conjectures them-
selves.
The evolutionary process we apply has been applied successfully to explain
various economic phenomena. The concept was proposed by GÜTH ANDYAARI
[1992], who called it the “indirect evolutionary approach.” As in our paper, the idea
is that subjects act rationally in their market transactions, but factors inﬂuencing
the market game, such as preferences or beliefs, are formed in an evolutionary
process. This approach has been used to explain, e.g., monopolistic competition
(GÜTH ANDHUCK [1997]), altruism (BESTER ANDGÜTH [1998]), and behavior in
the ultimatum game (HUCK ANDOECHSSLER [1999]). KÖNIGSTEIN ANDMÜLLER
[2000] propose aformalframeworkfortheindirect evolutionary approach. GEHRIG,
GÜTH, AND LEVINSKI[2004] analyze the evolution of beliefs about demand expec-
tations.
Independently ofthisresearch, DIXON ANDSOMMA[2003] haveobtainedsimilar
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between their study and the current study. First, we analyze both quantity and price2
competition. Second,while theyconsider ahomogeneous-good market,weconsider
a heterogeneous-good market, which includes a market for perfect substitutes as
a special case. Third, whereas DIXON ANDSOMMA [2003] ﬁnd that the consistent
conjecture is not evolutionarily stable in the case of constant marginal costs, we
show in this case that the consistent conjectures are evolutionarily stable – as long
as goods are not perfect substitutes. Fourth, while they adopt a dynamic approach
in their main analysis, we use the straightforward static concept of an evolutionarily
stable strategy (ESS).
Weproceed as follows. In section 2, we ﬁrst deﬁne the market and then derive the
consistent-conjectures equilibrium. In the second part of the section, we determine
the evolutionarily stable conjectures. In section 3 we discuss our ﬁndings.
2 Assumptions
We consider two ﬁrms i = 1,2 in a heterogeneous-goods market for both price and
quantity competition. In the Cournot setup, the strategy sets are Si ={ qi | qi ≥ 0},
i = 1,2, and the inverse demand functions are given by
pi(qi,qj) = a − qi − θqj, i, j = 1,2, i  = j, (1)
with 0 ≤ θ ≤ 1. To analyze price competition, we need to invert the inverse demand
functions
qi(pi, pj) =
a(1 − θ) − pi + θpj
1 − θ2 , i, j = 1,2, i  = j, (2)
and impose θ<1 strictly. The cost functions are
C(qi) = c(qi)
2 /2, i = 1,2, (3)
with c ≥ 0. The case of constant marginal cost is obtained by setting c = 0.F i r mi’s
proﬁt is given by
πi(qi,qj) =








in the Cournot case, and
πi(pi, pj) = pi












2 Somewhat surprisingly, with the exception of PFAFFERMAYR [1999], conjectural
variations have not been analyzed for price competition. PFAFFERMAYR [1999] shows
that the static conjectural-variations model may represent the joint-proﬁt-maximizing
collusive Nash equilibrium of a price-setting supergame with differentiated prod-
ucts. He also derives conditions under which the price-setting and the quantity-
setting conjectural-variations model yield the same outcome. (On this topic, see also
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in the Bertrand case. Our assumptions on demand and cost in the Cournot case are
the same as Assumptions 1 and 2 in BRESNAHAN [1981], except that we assume
that ﬁrms are symmetric.3
3 Quantity Competition
3.1 Consistent-Conjectures Equilibrium
We start by reiterating BRESNAHAN’s [1981] deﬁnition of a consistent-conjectures
equilibrium (CCE) with Cournot competition. Let ρi = ρi(qj), i  = j, denote ﬁrm
i’s reaction function. From our assumptions, we know that a unique and linear CCE
exists (BRESNAHAN[1981, Theorem 1]). We therefore restrict the attention to linear
conjectures such that ri ∈[ − 1,1], i = 1,2, denotes ﬁrm i’s conjectures about ﬁrm
j’s reaction to qi. The restriction ri ∈[ − 1,1] is imposed to guarantee equilibrium
quantitiestobenonnegative.Asiswellknown,theoutcomesinasymmetricCournot
duopoly range from perfect competition to joint monopoly when the conjectural
variation increases from −1t o1 .
DEFINITION 1 Aconsistent-conjectures equilibrium isapairofquantities, (q∗
1,q∗
2),
































That is, ﬁrms’ quantities have to be a Nash equilibrium (conditions (6)), and a ﬁrm’s
conjecture about the other ﬁrm’s behavior has to be equal to the slope of the other
ﬁrm’s reaction function (conditions (7)).
Wenowcompute aclosed-formsolution oftheCCEforthe marketdeﬁnedabove.
From the ﬁrst-order conditions of proﬁt maximization
∂πi(qi,qj)
∂qi
= a − θqj − qi(2 + θri + c) = 0 (8)
we derive ﬁrm i’s reaction function
ρi(qj) =
a − θqj
2 + θri + c
. (9)





2 + θri + c
. (10)
3 Bresnahan only analyzes quantity-setting ﬁrms. With asymmetric demand and
cost functions, the evolutionary analysis below is extremely messy and cumbersome.
BRESNAHAN [1981] shows that the model may also allow for ﬁxed costs, which, from
his Assumption 3, should not be too large.Conjectural Variations (2005) 495




2 + θrj + c
, i, j = 1,2, i  = j, (11)
whose two candidate solutions are given by
r := ri = rj =






(2 + c)2 − 4θ2 > 0. (13)
The equilibrium quantities q∗
i are the solution of the system of two simultaneous





c + θr + 2 + θ
. (14)
Note that, using the fact that r1 = r2 = r, the second-order condition for proﬁt




=− 2(1 + θr) − c < 0. (15)
The equilibrium quantities q∗





c + 2 + 2θ ± A
, (16)
which are both strictly positive. However, the second-order condition (15) reads
−2(1 + θr) − c =±A(−1). That is, the second-order condition is negative for the
positive root and positive for the negative root, so the positive root yields the
maximum.
To summarize the CCE, the unique conjecture is
r
∗ =
−2 − c + A
2θ
. (17)
(Note that r∗ < 0, as expected from the deﬁnition of consistency and the fact that





2(1 + θ) + c + A
, (18)






(2(1 + θ) + c + A)2, (19)
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3.2 Evolutionarily Stable Conjectures
In this subsection, instead of imposing a consistency condition as in Deﬁnition 1,
we will make conjectures subject to evolutionary selection. We will ﬁrst derive
ﬁrms’ outputs given their conjectures. Since conjectures determine proﬁts, they
also determine reproductive success, and we can study the evolutionary selection
of conjectures in a second step. The underlying assumption is that if ﬁrms differ
in evolutionary success, the individual characteristics of more successful ﬁrms
will spread within the population more quickly than the characteristics of the less
successful ones. This leads to a dynamic process that determines the long-run
distribution of individual characteristics within an economy.
Consider the two steps more formally. We will refer to ﬁrm i’s (constant) con-
jecture ri as to ﬁrm i’s type (higher polynomial conjectures are analytically not
tractable). Firms’ types may be completely arbitrary, and the types are known
whenever two ﬁrms compete against each other. We will derive ﬁrms’ behavior
given theirtypes. Within strategic gamesthis implies that the chosen strategy proﬁle
is a Nash equilibrium, denoted by (q∗
i (ri,rj), q∗
j(ri,rj)). In the second step, the types













evaluated at equilibrium strategies, are the payoff functions. To ﬁnd the types that
survive in the long run, we apply the static concept of an ESS (MAYNARD SMITH
[1982]).
DEFINITION 2 An equilibrium with evolutionarily stable conjectures is a pair of
quantities (q∗
1,q∗








































That is, an equilibrium with evolutionarily stable conjectures requires a Nash equi-
librium in outputs given the types (21), and an evolutionarily stable preference type
r∗ that is a best reply against itself (22) and no r-mutant invading a society of
r∗-players may be more successful than r∗ (23).
Wenowsolveforanequilibrium ofthiskind. First,assumethat c = 0andθ = 1do
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Substituting q∗
i (ri,rj) and q∗
j(ri,rj) in πi(·) yields the evolutionary success π∗
i (ri,rj)
of type ri, given that the opponent exhibits type rj:4
π
∗



















2(r2,r1)) and that the function π∗
i (ri,rj) determines evolutionary success for all
combinations of types. Therefore, we can simplify the notation and refer to π∗(r,l)
as type r’s evolutionary success when paired with type l.





∗(r,l) = 0. (27)
Thisﬁrst-orderconditioncanbesolvedforr =− θ/(2+θl +c).Settingr =l =r∗ and
solving the resulting quadratic equation with respect to r∗ results in two candidates
for an ESS:
r
∗ = (−2 − c ± A)/2θ, (28)
where A is deﬁned as in (13). We already know that the negative root violates the
second-order condition for proﬁt maximization with respect to output. Therefore,
only the candidate r∗ = (−2 − c + A)/2θ remains.










A2 − 2θ2 + θr (2 + c) + (2 + θr + c) A
2
(2(1 + θ) + c + A)
2,
where f(r) = a2r2 + a1r + a0 with













3 + 8θ + 8cθ + 2θc
2 + A(4θ + 2θc), (30)
a0 = 2θ
2A.
The sign of (29) is determined by the sign of the function f(r) = a2r2 + a1r + a0.
Note that a2 > 0 for given c and θ. Thus, f(r) is a U-shaped parabola for every given
set of c and θ. Solving ∂ f(r)/∂r = 0 for r shows that the minimum of the function
f(r) occurs at r =− a1/2a2. Now, note that f(−a1/2a2) = 0 and that −a1/2a2 = r∗.
That is, the function f and thus the expression π∗ (r∗,r∗)− π∗ (r,r∗) in (29) are 0 if
4 Note that the game with types ( ri,  rj) does not have an equilibrium if 4(1 + c)
+θ(2+c)( ri + rj)+θ2( ri rj −1)+c2 = 0. For such ( ri, rj) we proceed as in POSSA-
JENNIKOV [2000] by extending the ﬁtness function by continuity in the ﬁrst argument
in the sense that π∗
i ( ri, rj) = limri→ ri limrj→ rj π∗
i (ri,rj). This limit does always exist
on the extended real line R ∪{ ± ∞ } , and as a result the function π∗
i (ri,rj) is differen-
tiable with respect to the ﬁrst argument at rj = ri.Wieland Müller and Hans-Theo Normann 498 JITE 161
and only if r = r∗, and otherwise they are positive. This implies that r∗ is the unique
evolutionarily stable type (conjecture).
Finally,considerthecasec = 0andθ = 1,i.e.,thecaseofzero(constantmarginal)
costs and perfect substitutes. In this case, we have π∗ (r∗,r∗) = π∗ (r,r∗) for all






θ (r + 3)
2 ≤ 0 (31)
for all r ∈[ − 1,1] such that the condition (23) is violated. Thus, if c = 0 and θ = 1
the consistent conjecture is not evolutionarily stable. We have proven
PROPOSITION 1 The unique evolutionarily stable conjecture of the quantity game
is equal to the consistent conjecture and is given by
r
∗ =
−2 − c + A
2θ
,
unless c = 0 and θ = 1, in which case the consistent conjecture is not evolutionarily
stable.
Since the evolutionarily stable conjecture is equal to the consistent conjecture, the
outputs and proﬁts are also as in (18) and (19) above.
4 Price Competition
4.1 Consistent-Conjectures Equilibrium
As above, we compute a closed-form solution of the consistent-conjectures equilib-






















and derive ﬁrm i’s reaction function
ρi(pj) =

a(1 − θ) + θpj

(1 − θ2 + c(1 − θri))
2(1 − θ2) − θri(1 − θ2) + c(1 − θri)
. (32)
The slope of ﬁrm i’s reaction function is
θ(1 − θ2 + c(1 − θri))
2(1 − θ2) − θri(1 − θ2) + c(1 − θri)
. (33)
We obtain the consistent conjectures by using ri = rj and solving
r =
θ(1 − θ2 + c(1 − θr))
2(1 − θ2) − θr(1 − θ2) + c(1 − θr)
. (34)Conjectural Variations (2005) 499
There are two solutions. Inspection of the second-order conditions shows that the
following consistent conjecture yields the maximum:
r
∗ =






1 − θ2 + c
 , (35)
where A is deﬁned as above in the Cournot case. (Note r∗ > 0.)






2(1 − θ2) + c(c + 2 + A)

(2 + c + 2θ)(1 + c − θ) + (c + 1 + θ)A
, (36)




a2 (c + A)

4(1 − θ2) + c(4 + A + c)

2((2 + c + 2θ)(1 + c − θ) + (c + 1 + θ)A)
2. (37)
4.2 Evolutionarily Stable Conjectures
We proceed as above with Cournot competition. To compute the equilibrium prices,
we have to solve the system of ﬁrst-order conditions (32). The solution of this
system of equations yields p∗
1(r1,r2) and p∗
2(r1,r2), that is, the optimal prices given
the conjectures of the ﬁrms. These equilibrium prices are quite complex, so we























a2 (1 − θr1)

c + 2 − 2θ2 − θr1c





N = 4 + 4c + c
2 − θ[(2 + 3c + c
2)(r1 + r2)] (38)
−θ
2[5 − 2c +r1r2(1 + 2c + c
2)]
+θ





















canbe solved forr1 asa function ofr2. Setting r∗ = r1 = r2 and solving the resulting
quadratic equation for r∗ results in two candidates for an ESS. We already know the
relevant root, so we obtain
r
∗ =






1 − θ2 + c
 , (39)
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Note that the only solution of the equation ∂π∗ (r,r∗)/∂r = 0 is r = r∗. Further-
more it holds that π∗(r∗,r∗)>π ∗ (±1,r∗). Hencer∗ is the unique best reply against
itself, which implies that the stability requirement (23) is also fulﬁlled.
PROPOSITION 2 The unique evolutionarily stable conjecture of the price game is
equal to the consistent conjecture and is given by
r
∗ =






1 − θ2 + c
 . (40)
In contrast to the quantity-setting case, the limit case of constant marginal cost
(c = 0) and homogeneous goods is not a problem here, and the explicit solution can
be obtained.
5 Discussion
In this paper we propose an evolutionary process to select among conjectural vari-
ations in Cournot and Bertrand markets. We ﬁrst determine the unique equilibrium
in quantities and prices for all possible combinations of linear conjectures. For the
evolutionary game with conjectures as mutants and reproductive success (a ﬁrm’s
proﬁt) as the payoff function, we study conjectures that are evolutionarily stable.
It turns out that the equilibrium with evolutionarily stable conjectures is the same
as BRESNAHAN’s [1981] CCE. In this way, we justify both the outcome implied by
consistent conjectures and the conjectures themselves.
Evolution favors ﬁrm types with better relative performance. In our Cournot
model, a negative conjecture serves as a commitment device in the sense that it
yieldsaproﬁtimprovementoveratypewithalargerconjecture.Therefore,evolution
selects generally negative conjectures. In the Bertrand model, the same is true for
positive conjectures. However, the result that the evolutionarily stable conjectures
coincide with the consistent conjectures is surprising, asthere is no obvious analogy
between the two concepts.
Recently, POSSAJENNIKOV [2004] has generalized the results of DIXON AND
SOMMA [2003] and of this paper to abstract two-player games. It turns out that
the equilibrium with evolutionarily stable conjectures is equal to the CCE for
a large class of two-player games, provided some regularity conditions are met.5
POSSAJENNIKOV [2004] also suggests an intuition behind this result: whenever the
conjectureisconsistent, aplayercorrectlyanticipatesthereactionoftheotherplayer
and therefore maximizes the correct proﬁt function.
Our result may be positively interpreted in that it provides support for consistent
conjectures. The other side of the medal, the negative interpretation of our result,
5 GEHRIG,G ÜTH, AND LEVINSKI [2004] obtain a different result. They analyze the
evolution of beliefs about demand expectations. They ﬁnd that the evolution of be-
liefs about demand does not converge to rational expectations for markets with ﬁnitely
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is that no other conjecture can be justiﬁed by arguments based on evolutionary
selection. Many empirical researchers use the notion of conjectural variation as
a useful shortcut to capture the degree of “competitiveness” that is not reﬂected in
the numberof ﬁrms,the extentofproduct differentiation, costasymmetries, etc.The
conjecture is supposed to capture something that can be thought of as conduct in
the industry but that is hard to model explicitly (see, e.g.,K IM ANDVALE [2001]).
Our result indicates that conjectural variations cannot be used to reﬂect any degree
of competitiveness, as only one speciﬁc conjecture is evolutionarily stable. This
indicates that more research on the theoretical foundations of conjectural variations
is needed.
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